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Bad Holocaust Art
Abstract
This article examines the representation of the Holocaust in the visual arts, and evaluates theories of that
representation which seek to place limits upon artworks that are seen to transgress responsible modes.
Acknowledging that the Holocaust is one of the most fraught and contested of crime scenes, it opens by
studying the public responses to the Mirroring Evil exhibition, at the Jewish Museum in New York in 2002.
It traces changing critical and theoretical discourses about the limits of Holocaust representation, and
tests these against practices in literature, historiography, jurisprudence and visual art. In particular, it
describes the transgressive goals of certain practices within contemporary visual art, and proposes an
ethical framework for engaging with various forms of transgressive conduct.
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Figure 1. Tom Sachs, Giftgas Giftset, 1998
cardboard, ink, adhesive, foam. 35 x 44 x 12 in.
Image courtesy of the artist

Figure 2. Tom Sachs, Prada Deathcamp, 1998
cardboard, ink. adhesive. 27.25 x 27.25 x 2 in.
Image courtesy of the artist
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Bad Holocaust Art
Katherine Biber
You must find the proper place for everything you see but you’ll never get
to make a lampshade out of me.
– Elvis Costello and the Attractions, ‘Goon Squad’1

In 2002 the Jewish Museum in New York exhibited Mirroring Evil,
in which contemporary artists represented the Holocaust. Holocaust
survivors demonstrated against the exhibition, holding placards in
the street outside. An 81 year old survivor of Buchenwald, Isaac Leo
Kram, carried a sign that read: ‘I was there. I testify: Genocide is not
art!’ (Kershaw 2002). A sign at the entrance of the museum warned
visitors that some might be upset by the exhibition. The New York
press, typically supportive of the city’s art institutions when attacked by
critics, repeatedly questioned the Museum’s judgment in holding the
exhibition. At the heart of the controversy was grave concern that some
of the artworks were testing the limits of how the Holocaust could be
represented and remembered. Some of the artists, challenging longstanding conventions about Holocaust memory, tested whether it was
possible to employ irony, satire and pastiche, and whether the perspectives
of Holocaust perpetrators could be included. As the most historically
loaded of crime scenes, the Holocaust continues to bear the weight of
responsibility for its own representation, its own memorialisation; the
Holocaust continues to police its own status as history’s most traumatic
crime scene. Artists, filmmakers, writers and scholars continue to learn
that the Holocaust does not invite itself to be looked at with fresh eyes.
Law Text Culture Vol 13 20090000
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Representations of Holocaust crimes that are somehow ‘new’ or ‘creative’
or ‘challenging’ invite criticism, sanction, and repeated calls for silence.
Holocaust representation is a field contained within strict limits; certain
imaginings are said to be off-limits. Yet contemporary artists, almost
by nature, are motivated to test limits. Whether engaged in cultural
provocation or deeper meditation about genocide and its memory,
Mirroring Evil offered a forum for contemporary artists and their curators
to confront the traditional limits imposed upon Holocaust representation
by an earlier generation of survivors and scholars. This article examines
certain visual practices to see how history, memory and responsibility
operate in the visual remembrance of the Holocaust’s crimes. It reveals
the difficulty of balancing historical, ethical and moral values against
artistic aspirations. It argues that, whilst certain aesthetical practices
may be ‘wrong’ or ‘bad’, we need to exercise caution before claiming that
bad practices are equally bad, or that poor artistic judgment is as wrong
as criminal conduct.
Exhibited in Mirroring Evil, Alan Schechner’s work ‘It’s the Real
Thing – Self-Portrait at Buchenwald’ (1993) appropriates the famous
1945 Margaret Bourke-White photograph of starving male inmates
crowded into their bunks, all looking at the camera (see Figure 3).
Schechner super-imposed a photograph of himself into the foreground,
wearing a striped prison shirt and holding a can of Diet Coke. Only
the Coke can is in colour, and illuminated in shining light. Zbigniew
Libera, in ‘LEGO Concentration Camp Set’ (1996) displayed a series
of modified LEGO boxes containing the pieces needed to build a
concentration camp, a death chamber and torture facilities (see Figures
4-8). It includes black-helmeted soldiers and white, skeletal, smiling
victims. Both works interfere with the expectation that, when dealing
with Holocaust crimes, we need to be serious. At the centre of all
Holocaust discourse is the duty to be responsible; responsibility is the
hard kernel at the heart of every Holocaust representation. There can
be no idle chatter, no playful irreverence about the Final Solution;
everything speaks. For that reason, one line of critical thought argues
that there ought to be strict limits imposed upon what can be said
about the Holocaust.
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Figure 3. Alan Schechner
It's the Real Thing - Self-Portrait at Buchenwald, 1993
Digital still. www.dottycommies.com. Internet project
Image courtesy of the artist
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Figure 4. Zbigniew Libera, LEGO Concentration Camp Set, 1996
studio photograph, 20 x 30cm
Seven cardboard boxes. Edition of three.
Image courtesy Raster Gallery, Warsaw

Figure 5. Zbigniew Libera, LEGO Concentration Camp Set, 1996,
brick set (box detail),
Seven cardboard boxes. Edition of three.
Image courtesy Raster Gallery, Warsaw
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Figure 6. Zbigniew Libera, LEGO Concentration Camp Set, 1996
studio photograph, 20 x 30cm
Seven cardboard boxes. Edition of three.
Image courtesy Raster Gallery, Warsaw

Figure 7. Zbigniew Libera, LEGO Concentration Camp Set, 1996
box design, archive material, 28 x 27cm
Seven cardboard boxes. Edition of three.
Image courtesy Raster Gallery, Warsaw
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Figure 8. Zbigniew Libera, LEGO Concentration Camp Set, 1996
box design, archive material, 78 x 71.5cm
Seven cardboard boxes. Edition of three.
Image courtesy Raster Gallery, Warsaw

Ernst van Alphen wrote that ‘Holocaust survivors and new
generations after the Holocaust have a special responsibility towards its
historical events’ (2001: 45, emphasis added). Hayden White asked, ‘Are
there any limits on the kind of story that can responsibly be told about
these phenomena?’ (1992: 37, emphasis added). James R. Watson (1992)
warned us about the perils of failing to impose limits. Concurring with
Jürgen Habermas, he wrote of the necessity for ‘critical intellectual
activity’ to identify and police the limitations of the human conditions
(1992: 171-2). Failure to do so would allow the unimpeded perpetuation
of the ‘almost autonomous economic system’ whose ‘rampant reduction
of everything and everyone to a resource in the self-destructive frenzy
of consumption’ enabled ‘State organized mass murder’ (Watson 1992:
171-2). The development of institutions which set limits upon this
murderous autonomy needs to be supported, he argued, and the failure
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of art and philosophy to defend those limits is a ‘delusional intellectual
pretension’ (Watson 1992: 172). Without limits, this argument claims,
the Holocaust is always imaginable, possible and repeatable.

Yet the artwork of Tom Sachs, represented in the Mirroring
Evil exhibition, skips blithely — even obliviously — through this
representational minefield. His work ‘Giftgas, Giftset’ (1998) contains
three dented cylinders labeled as containing Zyklon B, each wrapped
as gifts using the colours and typeface from the Chanel, Hermes and
Tiffany & Co. labels (see Figure 1). Another work, ‘Prada Deathcamp’
(1998) is a 27-inch model of a concentration camp made from a
deconstructed Prada hat box, ink and wire (see Figure 2). Sachs was
interviewed in the New York Times about these works:
Sachs:

Q:

Sachs:

Q:

Sachs:

I’m using the iconography of the Holocaust to bring
attention to fashion. Fashion, like fascism, is about
loss of identity. Fashion is good when it helps you to
look sexy, but it’s bad when it makes you feel stupid
or fat because you don’t have a Gucci dog bowl and
your best friend has one.

How can you, as a presumably sane person, use the
Nazi death camps as a metaphor for the more coercive
aspects of the fashion industry? It makes me think
you have failed to grasp the gravity of the Holocaust.
My agenda isn’t about making a point about the
Holocaust. I don’t think any of the artists in the show
are trying to make a point about the Holocaust. We’re
mostly in our 30’s and 40’s, and we have a certain
distance from those events …
So what are your aims as an artist?

My main interest is bricolage … (Solomon New York
Times 10 March 2002).

On one level of interpretation, Sachs’s work seems to commentate
on precisely the same ‘frenzy of consumption’ that Watson identified
as analogous with genocide. And yet the main critical and public
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response to Sachs’s work was that is suffered from the ‘delusional
intellectual pretension’ that characterised the worst in Holocaust
art; Sachs was in large part responsible for reviews dismissing the
entire show as ‘an emergency ward for toxic narcissism’ (Schjeldahl
2002: 87), ‘sheer stupidity’ and ‘not to be forgiven’ (Kramer 2002).
The show’s curator, Norman L. Kleeblatt, admitted the capacity for
‘Nazi-era images to probe issues at the center of prevailing cultural
and aesthetic discourses, among them desire, commodification,
and spectatorship’ (2002b: 15 emphasis added). And Jean-Pierre
Geuens rejected imposing limitations upon Holocaust representation,
writing ‘the wounds should be repeatedly and mercilessly stabbed
open with a knife for the Holocaust to remain the mirror that truly
defines our limits’ (1995-6: 127). It isn’t certain that Sachs’s work
meets Geuens’s challenge; dismantling a Prada hatbox to explore
one’s interest in fashion, commodity fetishism and bricolage seems
a considerably lower aim than the merciless self-examination that
Geuens demands. Much more needs to be said about precisely what
we can learn about desire or commodification from the Holocaust
before Sachs is acquitted of accusations that he is ‘facile’ (Saltzman
2002: 94). It is not that these conversations cannot take place, nor that
the Holocaust can teach us only about atrocity, terror and cruelty. But
more is required here than the assertion that it can be done. If the
Holocaust’s crimes teach us nothing else, it is the gravity of pursuing
the possible simply to explore its possibility. Is it preferable, then,
to denounce Sachs as a bad artist, or his work as bad art? Theodor
Adorno warned us about ‘wringing pleasure’ from the Holocaust
(Geuens 1995-6: 114); to do so would be ‘barbarism’ where aesthetic
‘success’ would have ‘consequences of its own’, where the audience
could ‘transcend the horror’ and recognise the ‘greatness’ of the art
(Geuens 1995-6: 114). Is it possible — is it responsible — to make
great art about the Holocaust?
A more fundamental question is this: Should anyone make art
about the Holocaust? Is this a crime scene that ought not to be visually
represented? Are the crimes that occurred here unimaginable? At the
ultimate limits of Holocaust representation is silence. From different
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perspectives but for related reasons, a large number of critical scholars
echo the call for silence: Berel Lang wrote that any representation
of the Holocaust ‘must be judged against the criterion of respectful
silence that should be our first response to it’ (in White 1992: 43).
For George Steiner, ‘the world of Auschwitz lies outside speech as it
lies outside reason’ (in Geuens 1995-6: 115). Irving Howe feared that
any representation of the Shoah would ‘domesticate it, rendering it
familiar and in some sense even tolerable’ (in Geuens 1995-6: 115). Elie
Wiesel stated that ‘Auschwitz negates all literature’ (in Geuens 1995-6:
115). Michael André Bernstein preferred ‘thematically weighted and
deliberately chosen silence as the only ethically unsullied response that
art can make to the Shoah’ (1994: 43). By remaining silent, we avoid
diminishing ourselves by engaging in discourse with depravity. But
precisely what is the responsibility of the silent subject? Does silence
require us to draw privately upon our reserve of conscience and just feel
bad? Or does silence permit us to forget about it, move on, sail forward
into the world deaf to the clamouring of history, exploring whole new
oceans of atrocity? What does silence say?

Susan Sontag traced the changing significance of silence as a tool
in artistic representation. Silence functioned as ‘a zone of meditation’,
or an ‘ambivalence about making contact with the audience’ (1976: 6),
or a decision (as in the suicide of the artist), or a punishment (as in the
madness of the artist), or effected through censorship, destruction of
artworks, exile. Sontag identified a tenacious refusal to take seriously
the quest for silence: ‘The art of our time is noisy with appeals for silence.
… One recognizes the imperative of silence, but goes on speaking
anyway. Discovering that one has nothing to say, one seeks a way
to say that’ (1976: 12). Berel Lang conceded the same condition, the
impossibility of silence, despite its utter appropriateness: ‘all claims …
on the unspeakable that cover also the indescribable, the unthinkable,
the unimaginable, the incredible — come embedded in yards of writing
that attempt to overcome the inadequacy of language in representing
moral enormity at the same time that they assert its presence’ (2000:
18). For Lang, silence remains as the measure of articulation: ‘whatever
is written ought to be justifiable as more probative, more incisive,
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more revealing, than its absence or, more cruelly, its erasure’ (2000:
18). But the oppressive potential of systematised silence must not
go unchallenged. Bernstein argued that the refusal to represent the
Shoah is ‘a far more menacing position’ (1994: 4). Being forbidden from
representing it transforms silence into a disciplinary tool of terror.
Because, of course, all silence speaks. And, in the case of the Final
Solution, there are no inadvertent omissions.

The difficulty with any measure, the futility in exercising judgment
or choice, lies in locating the limits, the boundaries, of the representable.
Everywhere we are cautioned against crossing the line, but nowhere
is it possible to perceive where the line is drawn. Susan Sontag, seeing
photographs taken after the liberation of Bergen-Belsen and Dachau,
experienced the transgression of a hitherto-unknown limit: ‘When
I looked at those photographs, something broke. Some limit had been
reached ’ (1977: 19-20 emphasis added). The inability to articulate
precisely when the limit has been reached was echoed by Andreas
Huyssen, who claimed that the question is ‘to be decided case by case’
(2000: 29). Berel Lang cautioned us against engaging in rhetorical
boundary skirmishes about limits. He wrote: ‘One could imagine here
the inversion of a Kafkaesque tale in which the existence of a limit was
proclaimed but what it ‘limited’ or excluded was left unstated’ (Lang
2000: 66). In Lang’s tale, the antihero grows increasingly obsessed and
paranoid, and ‘even his largest excesses fail to bring him into contact
with the limit’ (Lang 2000: 66).
The first and the most regularly invoked of the limits to Holocaust
representation is a sense of responsibility to its victims. When the artist
Bruce Nauman was asked in 1992 to design a Holocaust memorial for
Hanover, he proposed a sign that read: ‘We are sorry for what we did,
and we promise not to do it again’. For art critic Peter Schjeldahl, this
sentence represented the limits of speech for Holocaust perpetrators.
Beyond an apology and an assurance, perpetrators cannot speak;
‘Whatever else might be said has belonged to the victims’ (Schjeldahl
2002). In Mirroring Evil, the Israeli artist Boaz Arad transforms
apology into art. Having trawled film and sound archives of Hitler’s
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propaganda speeches, he edited together ‘Hebrew Lesson’ (2000), a
film that shows Adolf Hitler saying, in Hebrew, “Greetings Jerusalem,
I apologise” (“Shalom Yerushalayim, Ani mitnatzel”). 2 The stilted
footage repeats itself; the apology is re-stated seven times, enabling
the viewer gradually to comprehend the initially inaudible message.
Some viewers reported that they could never make out the message,
and —consequently — that Hitler had failed to learn his lesson (Ray
2005: 121-134).
Centering the victim in Holocaust discourse is impossible without
also addressing the perpetrator; one does not stand in Holocaust
discourse unaccompanied by the other. Arad’s film takes the artist
and the viewer towards the perpetrator position. The catalogue entry
describes how Arad, in the meticulous process of editing the footage,
‘has become intimate with Hitler, deeply familiar with his words, his
inflections’ and yet how, through the project, ‘he is able to exert power
over the Führer and manipulate him, using the same propaganda
films that Hitler used to exert power over the German public’ (JL in
Kleeblatt 2002a: 121-122). This catalogue description suggests that
the exhibition’s curators have conflated artistic choice with genocidal
intent, claiming some kind of equivalence of power between artist and
Führer. It is this article’s argument that the fundamental problem in
the debate over visually representing the Holocaust is the mistaken
claim to equivalence or resemblance — the mirroring of evil in art.
Art may show evil, but it is not implicitly capable of evil. Both may
be wrong, but they are not examples of the same wrongness. They
operate in separate registers and need to be assessed on their own
terms. A video artist in Israel wields none of the power exercised
by Adolf Hitler. Nor does he seek to do so. To say that the artistic
process has made the artist Hitler’s ‘intimate’, to say that Arad now
‘exert[s] power over the Führer’, is the kind of specious curatorial
blather that warrants the kind of critical sanction that followed the
opening of Mirroring Evil. As this article’s opening epigraph (by
Elvis Costello) asserts, each representation has its ‘proper place’ and
it is our duty to put it in its place; whilst things may fall out of their
place, there is also a limit which they must never transgress. Here,
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this is the point where art itself becomes an act of depravity: making
lampshades from the skin of one’s victims.

Whilst Arad’s film achieves its subversive intent, and also its
demand that the viewer decide whether or not it is possible to forgive
Hitler, it (more so than the catalogue entry describing it) remains aware
of the dangers of occupying the perpetrator position. The impossibility
of representing Holocaust crimes without dealing with the perpetrators
is the point of much of the art of Anselm Keifer. Writing about the
‘transcendence’ made possible by Keifer’s photographs of himself
saluting before German national monuments, James R. Watson
wrote, ‘Keifer’s point is that there is no art undertaking which does
not partake of that which it critiques’, and that ‘No representational
medium can be used after Auschwitz that does not somehow bear the
traces of the transformative event’ (1992: 178, 179). This is despite
Bruno Bettelheim’s warning that any attempt to come close to the
perpetrator may lead us to an ‘understanding’ that ‘may come close to
forgiving’; he wrote, ‘I believe there are acts so vile that our task is to
reject and prevent them, not to try to understand them empathetically’
(in Browning 1992: 35-6). Christopher Browning (1992: 36) refused
to accept that understanding can be conf lated with forgiveness.
Nevertheless, our responsibility to the victim is negotiated through our
refusal to allow the perpetrator to speak, except in the most limited
terms. In Arad’s work, the perpetrator’s voice is halting, stuttering,
and his gestures unnatural. It clearly performs the precarious balance
that makes the suffering of the victims available without making the
perpetrator’s position inhabitable.

Saul Friedlander speculated that we have set representational
limits that arise from the arbitrary historical outcome that the
Nazis were defeated. He asked, ‘what would have happened if the
Nazis had won the war? No doubt there would have been a plethora
of pastoral emplotments of life in the Third Reich and of comic
emplotments of the disappearance of its victims’ (1992b: 10). The
work of Israeli artist Roee Rosen in Mirroring Evil enters this terrain.
His installation, ‘Live and Die as Eva Braun’ (1995) is a book of 60
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black-and-white drawings in various genres and media, frequently
using the conventions of children’s book illustration, illustrating
the life and death of Braun. The catalogue entry states, ‘She [Eva]
shares intimacies that are at once naïve, titillating, and vulgar. At
every turn, the narrative is accompanied by drawings that mirror its
paradoxical juncture between naïveté and pornography’ (NLK in
Kleeblatt 2002a: 101). Rosen’s work, for his exploration of perpetrator
psychology, saw him denounced as a Holocaust ‘relativiser’, and an
earlier exhibition of this piece in the Israel Museum in 1997 led to
the Israeli Minister for Education to call for its closure. International
media reports challenged Rosen’s use of sexualised imagery, its sense
of intimacy with Braun, and accusations that his work was gratuitous,
sensational or pornographic. The curator of Mirroring Evil, however,
suggested that Rosen’s position ‘possessed greater “legitimacy” than
many because he is the son of a Holocaust survivor’ (NLK in Kleeblatt
2002a: 101); this logic is widely debated and disputed amongst Israeli
Jews, diaspora Jews, and gentiles: that surviving the Holocaust confers
extra entitlements. Rosen’s aim was not to claim such ‘legitimacy’
for his contentious artwork; his aim was, in part, to confront a longstanding Israeli cultural proscription against visually representing the
Holocaust. More recently, Ari Libsker’s documentary film Stalags:
Holocaust and Pornography in Israel (2007) reveals that there was, in the
early 1960s, an underground publishing phenomenon in Israel, known
as ‘stalags’, where the Holocaust and Nazi themes were portrayed in
pornographic modes. Libsker’s film posits that this was the first form
of locally-produced pornography in Israel, and the creator of the series
attributed their motivation and popularity to the public interest in
the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 (Kershner 2007).
‘Live and Die as Eva Braun’ does not represent Jews, or indeed any
Nazi victims, and contains none of the themes of victimisation and
memorialisation apparent in Holocaust memorials created by other
Israeli artists. Most seriously, however, it seems Rosen’s offence was
not only his choice to represent the perpetrator perspective, but also
his imaginative departure from the historical record.
Whereas artists are generally free to exercise creative and
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imaginative powers, they will confront a strictly-guarded disciplinary
(and ethical) boundary when they make art about historical events and,
especially, art about Holocaust crimes. Unlike artists, historians remain
committed to finding ways of accommodating the Holocaust within
existing historiographical limitations. For Christopher Browning, the
distinction between ‘indisputable fact’ and ‘falsification’ requires our
consideration of the ‘degree of plausibility’ of a claim, whether it is
‘more or less coherent and persuasive’ (1992: 33). Whilst he stated that
‘archetypal cases [of fact or falsification] seem obvious’, for ‘borderline
cases’, he conceded, ‘I do not know’ (1992: 33). Perry Anderson was
more certain: ‘absolute limits are set by the evidence’, and ‘exterior limits’
prevent outright denial of the Holocaust or other ‘counterfactuals’
(1992: 64). Hayden White wrote, ‘the facts of the matter set limits
on the kinds of stories that can be properly … told’ (1992: 39). For
Anderson, ‘narrative strategies, to be credible’ prevent the plotting of
the Final Solution ‘historically’ in romance or comedy genres (1992: 64).
For White, ‘comic’ or ‘pastoral’ modes of emplotment are ‘manifestly
false to the facts — or at least to the facts that matter — of the Nazi
era’ (1992: 39). In the responsible historiography of the Holocaust,
ethical representation requires close adherence to the facts. Hayden
White said that ethics determines ‘unacceptable modes of emplotment’
(1992: 38), unacceptable because ‘they offended against morality or
taste’ (1992: 40-41). These positions suggest that, epistemologically
speaking, Holocaust questions are settled. Holocaust representations,
it follows, ought to hold close to the known facts. But knowing all the
facts raises the difficulty of finding new ways of re-telling a story whose
conclusion is well-known.
Michael André Bernstein, arguing against the narrative tendency
to ‘foreshadow’ the doom that concludes so many Holocaust narratives,
wrote that these texts should resist being ‘monuments of inevitability’
(1994: 4), reliant upon ‘the necessary importation of our knowledge about
the Shoah’ (1994: 61). This suggests either that we shouldn’t allow what
we already know to operate upon us as we approach a representation,
or else that we needn’t know anything to begin to think about the
Holocaust. Is it possible — is it responsible — to approach the Holocaust
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in innocence, or with an open mind? If visually representing Holocaust
crimes requires an imaginative enterprise, how does one unleash one’s
imagination within tight factually-confined limits?

Andreas Huyssen argued against our limiting the language
or genres through which the Holocaust may be spoken. If, as he
claimed, it is our ‘responsibility to prevent forgetting’, then it may
be appropriate when addressing post-Holocaust generations to admit
‘melodramatic soap opera’ and the ‘fictionalized’ and ‘emotionalized’
narratives of prime time television (1995: 256). He argued, ‘If the
Holocaust can be compared to an earthquake that has destroyed all
the instruments for measuring it, as Lyotard has suggested, then
surely there must be more than one way of representing it’ (1995:
256). The artists represented in Mirroring Evil, whilst diverse in
their aims and methods, share one common feature. Rather than
addressing themselves to a nominal, abstracted, historical Holocaust
victim, requiring the ethical duty of responsibility and respect, they
address a contemporary art viewer. Each of these artists tries to affect
their audience, and their audience is presumed to be historically
knowledgeable, culturally sophisticated and — and this is the
troubling quality — preoccupied with their personal worries and
bored with old routines. This audience, these artists presume, needs
to be shocked into remembrance. New horrors need to be introduced
to remind us that Holocaust crimes remain horrifying.

The demand to create a new visual repertoire returns us to one of
the Holocaust’s earliest representational crises: the challenge to achieve
judicial proof of its crimes; the challenge of law. Law’s first response
to Holocaust crimes was to open itself up to the imaginative register,
acknowledging the simultaneously probative and shocking power of
images. Prosecutors at the Nuremberg Tribunal knew that existing
modes of representation were insufficient for adducing and proving
Holocaust crimes; as Lawrence Douglas wrote, ‘the law had to locate
an adequate idiom of both representation and judgment’ (1995: 453).
For Douglas, the Tribunal’s role was to ‘demonstrate law’s power to
reintroduce its ordering effects … into a space of spectacular excess and
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egregious lawlessness’ (1995: 463). Because the crimes addressed were
literally unprecedented, the Tribunal admitted new types of evidence
— visual evidence — invoking the necessity ‘to translate images of
atrocity into a discourse of illegality’ (1995: 457). Speaking particularly
about the screening of the documentary film Nazi Concentration Camps,
Douglas wrote that, by offering ‘visual proof of astonishing atrocities’,
the evidence was persuasive for its ‘symbolic content’, and not any direct
or conventional probative value (2001: 294). As Douglas identified,
evidence of atrocity was admitted out of ‘law’s need to justify its own
beleaguered normativity’ (2001: 294).

Screening the documentary at Nuremberg, as well as tendering as
exhibits flayed human skin covered in tattoos, and a shrunken head
(the head of a Polish prisoner, the skull removed, shrunk, stuffed and
preserved by the Buchenwald camp commandant as a grotesque curio
for his wife), tested the limits of law. These items were evidence not of
any direct legal guilt of the defendants. Instead they proved barbarity,
depravity; as Douglas argued, they were evidence of ‘crimes of atavism:
horrific deeds committed in an orgy of mass savagery and lawlessness’
(2001: 278). The challenge for law was the reassertion of civilisation,
order and control into a space where primitivism went unsanctioned.
Douglas wrote, ‘by serving as an icon of atavism, the shrunken head
presented an image of atrocity familiar to liberal jurisprudence: of the
law as civilization’s bulwark against barbarism’ (2001: 279). Whilst
observers recoiled at the wrongness of this object, including its
wrongness as an evidentiary exhibit, it was not as if head-shrinking
was unknowable to civil society, or even to this court; Douglas tells
us that its English Chief Justice, Geoffrey Lawrence, was elevated to
England’s High Court in 1932, the year that Oxford University, his
alma mater, acquired two shrunken heads from the Jivaro of Equador.
Postcards of these exhibits are still available today from the gift shop.
Jivaro methods were said to have been studied by Nazi head shrinkers
(Douglas 2001: 279). The point was that this civil society, this court,
refused to tolerate the barbarism of the defendants, people who should
have known better but did not exercise responsible restraint upon their
barbaric fantasies.
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The Tribunal, at this early stage, was drawing a distinction that had
begun to disappear by the time of the Mirroring Evil exhibition: the
distinction between wrong-doing and wrong-showing. This distinction
was easily apparent to two of the defendants at Nuremberg. Of Field
Marshal Keitel, Douglas wrote that, upon seeing the shrunken head
presented to the court, ‘Keitel, himself no stranger to brutal behavior,
whispered “Furchtbar! Furchtbar!” – Horrible! Horrible!’ (2001: 280281). Hermann Goering’s response to the screening of the documentary
was to say ‘And then they showed that awful film, and it just spoiled
everything’ (Douglas 1995: 449). Goering’s comment here suggests
that, quite apart from his culpability in mass crimes, there is an implicit
wrongness in exhibition. The documentary film and the shrunken
head highlight the distinction between evidence of legal guilt and
evidence that evokes visceral responses, independently of legal guilt.
The Holocaust’s crimes inaugurated horror as a new legal category. As
United States prosecutor Robert Jackson stated at Nuremberg, ‘These
are things which have turned the stomach of the world’ (Douglas
2001: 282). For this reason these artefacts, although not probative
of the crimes in issue, were given the status of legal evidence. Such
evidence must have been lawful because it was disgusting. Law became
the institutional process by which our disgust was classified, codified,
given a vocabulary; from the pit of our stomach emerged a system of
revulsion, a capacity for articulating visceral judgment. The disturbing
exhibition, the visually-wrong representations, needed to be absorbed
within the legal limits if law’s ordering capacity was to continue to
function. Far from expelling abject imagery, law brought it within its
own jurisdiction.

Alison Young (2000), looking at the relationship between law
and ‘transgressive’ art, explored the emergence of a jurisprudence of
disgust, in particular, law’s capacity to sanction ‘disgusting’ visual
representations. Introducing the concept of ‘aesthetic vertigo’, she
considered whether this sensation has the capacity to destabilise law,
or whether it can be corrected through legal judgment and repression
(Young 2000: 261). To consider that law has a relationship with disgust,
that each has the capacity for conversation with the other, requires the
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articulation of limits beyond which they do not engage. In the case of
law and art, Young suggested that each may be testing the limitations of
the other. Whereas law tends only to respond to art when so provoked,
art — and artists — may engage in willful and deliberate testing of
law’s limits.

In response to provocative art, law embraced the category of
‘obscenity’ through which it could regulate artistic productions that
are disgusting; but identifying obscenity always involves a degree of
judgment. Lynda Nead wrote, ‘obscenity’s beginning is art’s end; art
starts where obscenity terminates’ (1999: 205-6). Policing the boundary
is law. The distinction was articulated by Harper J in the Australian
obscenity case in which the Archbishop of Melbourne sought an
injunction against the exhibition of Andres Serrano’s ‘Piss Christ’: Pell
v Council of the Trustees of the National Gallery of Victoria:
[There has been no] assumption by me of the role of art critic. It would
not merely be presumptuous, but quite wrong, of me to attempt any
such thing. It is not relevant to my task and it would take the court
into places in which it has no business to be. There is much wisdom
… in the words of Landau J, the Israeli judge who presided over the
trial of Adolf Eichmann. The courts, he said, speak with an authority
whose very weight depends upon its limitations. No-one has made us
judges of matters outside the realm of law (at 392-3).

It is significant that, in stating that law has places of business and
places where it has no business, Harper J refers to a landmark example
of transgression and law’s attempt to deal with it: Holocaust. Citing
Landau J in this context is intended to add incontrovertible legitimacy
to Harper J’s claim that law recognises limits; indeed, law is rendered
possible and effective only because of its recognition of those limits.
Art, by this argument, is separate from law and legal regulation until
it becomes obscene. When it transgresses this boundary, it is brought
within the governance of law; obscenity becomes law’s responsibility.
But, for Young, the categories of ‘art’ and ‘obscenity’ are
‘irrevocably insinuated’ (2000: 250). And for certain artistic practices,
it is the deliberate intention of the artist to insinuate one within the
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other. Artists like Serrano aspire to more than ‘the simple shudder
of revulsion’ in response to their art, ‘desiring instead the full weight
of censure from the paternal Law’ (Young 2000: 262). Young wrote,
‘Abjection — in its requirement that the disgusting object be expelled,
outlawed and repressed — demands a regulatory responsiveness in
the subject’ (2000: 262). By invoking law to take responsibility for
regulating artistic work, artists attempt to expand the limits of both
art and law, but to what end? Is it to enable repression, or to expose
the repressive capacities of law? For Susan Sontag, it is the ‘chronic
habit’ of contemporary art to displease, provoke or frustrate; but, as
an actual practice, the regularity of its violations become anticipated,
even accommodated: ‘the artist’s transgression becomes ingratiating,
eventually legitimate’ (Sontag 1976: 7). This is apparent when, in the
Director’s Preface to the Mirroring Evil exhibition catalogue, Joan
Rosenbaum referred to the artworks as ‘transgressive’, ‘difficult,
challenging’, ‘provocative and troubling’, positively inviting responses
predicated upon disgust (2002: viii).

Contemporary notions of art suggest that art transcends all limits,
that it defies all attempts to impose upon it responsibilities to anything,
including to notions of aesthetic beauty. For Berel Lang, ‘art appears
here as independent of history, weightless, untouched by motive, cause,
or purpose’ (2000: 160-161). This view of art suggests that art can do
anything, but that we can do nothing about it. Art’s autonomy from
moral discourse means that, for Lang, in the context of ‘Holocaust
images’, special and serious attention is needed (2000: 164-166). Lang
identifies four different representational transgressions: (1) impossible
and unimaginable, (2) imaginable but impossible, (3) unimaginable
but possible, (4) imaginable and possible (2000: 54-55). It is the fourth
position that is the source of our enduring trouble; for Lang, it is here
that ‘the conception of limits as moral comes fully into view’ (2000: 57).
We are given a moral responsibility to observe certain boundaries when
we seek to represent atrocities that are both possible and imaginable.
But the actual requirements for moral conduct are never articulated
explicitly. As Saul Friedlander observed, transgressions are identified
through ‘a kind of uneasiness’ (1992b: 3-4).
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Nazism is ‘an unlimited field for a surge of the imagination, for a
use of aesthetic effects, for a demonstration of literary brilliance and
the power of one’s intellect’ (Friedlander 1984: 20). But, whilst it may
inspire a ‘masterpiece’, it inspires also a feeling that it is ‘tuned in the
wrong key’, that ‘some kind of limit has been overstepped’ and we have
moved into a ‘new discourse’ (Friedlander 1984: 21). There is no clearlydrawn boundary, no black letter of law, just the expectation that we will
shudder, and from this shudder will flow an act of responsibility. What
makes for ‘good’ Holocaust art? Is it a matter of aesthetic judgment,
or is it whatever makes us shudder? And, where certain Holocaust
images come to achieve the status of ‘icons’ (Brink 2000: 137), or
‘clichés’ (Hirsch 2001: 5, Huyssen 1995: 255), or ‘kitsch’ (Friedlander
1984: 27), are newer and more destabilising representations justified
for getting a now-jaded audience to shudder?

Looking at the Mirroring Evil exhibition, James E. Young asked,
‘Just what are the limits of taste and irony here?’ (2002: xvi). Michael
André Bernstein argued that there are artistic or literary representations
of the Shoah that are ‘deeply offensive’ because they are characterised
by ‘tastelessness’, ‘vulgarity’ and ‘exploitation’ (1994: 52). That taste
becomes a term of judgment indicates a conflation of artistic standards
with moral ones. But it is not a moral judgment that proscribes; to say
that a representation is in bad taste does not argue for its elimination
or prohibition. Instead it ranks the representation in a hierarchical
structure that reflects bourgeois social standards, where representations
in bad taste appear beneath those that are in better taste. It suggests,
also, that it is possible to imagine a representation that is in impeccable
taste, flawlessly turned out. And a representation of the Holocaust that
is tasteful is likely flawed for that very reason.

As Omer Bartov (1996) warned, even tasteful representation
carries with it the mendacious potential for voyeurism, the dangerous
pleasure that describes our fascination. Bartov identified the source of
his unease in the ‘obsession, with perversity and obscenity, inhumanity
and criminality, aggression and horror’; but the viewing position is
not rampantly depraved; instead its combines ‘cool aesthetic pleasure’
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and ‘mild nausea’, responding to representations that are ‘attractive,
stimulating, interesting’ (1996: 116). Our ‘obsession with fascism’, he
cautions, bears an ‘uncanny resemblance’ to the phenomenon itself
(Bartov 1996: 116). It is this uncanny resemblance that seems to be
encapsulated in the title of Mirroring Evil. But it is crucial to remember
— and it is the central argument of this article — that fascinations with
fascism, wringing artistically-provocative pleasures from Holocaust
crimes — are not, in themselves, criminal acts. Whilst they may seem
wrong or bad, they are not criminally so, and share no equivalence —
they do not bear an uncanny resemblance — to acts of genocide.

The long-prevailing view, that the uniqueness of the Holocaust
imposes special limits upon its representation, has begun to yield to
another view, which sees those limits stretching with the passage
of time. Saul Friedlander noted that ‘we are confronted with the
two sides of Hitler: that of yesterday and that of today’ (1984: 72).
Yesterday’s account is reliant upon ‘facts’ and ‘reality’; today we
wrangle with ‘reinterpretation’ and ‘aestheticization’ (Friedlander
1984: 72). Further, the period immediately after the Allied liberation
of the camps gave Holocaust representations the capacity to shock
because of the element of surprise, a capacity that with their repetition
over time may have worn away. Writing about the screening of the
documentary at Nuremberg, Lawrence Douglas pointed out, ‘The
horror captured in Nazi Concentration Camps is by now so familiar that
it is difficult to imagine an original screening — that is, a screening
that shocks not simply because of the barbarity of the images, but also
because of their novelty’ (1995: 464). The film, he argued, provided
a ‘visual register of atrocity’ where previously there had been none,
‘cross[ing] a threshold of representation from which there was no
turning back’ (1995: 464). Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi also identified
Nuremberg as a turning point in Holocaust representation. Whilst
for many years certain types of representation were ‘unthinkable’, the
post-war trials, beginning with the International Military Tribunal,
rendered the barbarity ‘performative’, gradually enabling Nazism to
become open to ‘more radical acts of imaginative projection’ (Ezrahi
2002: 25).
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But whilst, for Ezrahi, these representations are to be congratulated
for their ‘courageous self-examination and self-exposure’ (2002: 19),
Susan Sontag cautioned us against giving in to the enduring fascination
with fascism. When the artist Robert Morris posed in Nazi gear for an
exhibition poster, he is said to have done so on the grounds that it is ‘the
only image that still has any power to shock’, relegating Nazism to some
back-catalogue of all-purpose icons (Sontag 1980b: 101). As a view of
art, Sontag suggested, it conformed to the quest for ‘ever-fresh gestures
of provocation’ (1980b: 101). As a view of society, it failed to address
the mendacious allure of fascism, both aesthetically and politically
(Sontag 1980b: 101). Her warning reminds us that novelty and shock
value cannot be confined to the aesthetic context; any representation
that uses fascism must, of necessity, commentate also on the operation
of power and terror in fascist practices. That Nazi imagery is capable
of teaching us about art says something far more troubling about the
socio-cultural milieu in which repression, cruelty and mass murder
have independent value as aesthetic iconography.

The curator of Mirroring Evil, Norman L. Kleeblatt, admitted, ‘most
ideological boundaries — especially those regarding representation
— have a way of dissolving with time. What has seemed shocking,
transgressive, or inappropriate in one decade becomes normalized by
repeating exposure and by distance’ (2002b: 11). Susan Sontag wrote
that, in liberal societies, that which has been ‘hitherto unmentionable’
may be rehabilitated smoothly: ‘It is not that Reifenstahl’s Nazi past
has suddenly become acceptable. It is simply that, with the turn of the
cultural wheel, it no longer matters. … [A] liberal society settles such
questions by waiting for cycles of taste to distill out the controversy’
(Sontag 1980b: 83-84). Again: taste. And, in the case of Holocaust
representation, there are those who take an orthodox position (that
which promotes respect for victims and survivors as the primary
consideration) who accept that the current ‘cycle’ of Holocaust
representation will roll forward when the last of the survivors is dead.
With the dying out of this generation, Peter Schjeldahl lamented that
‘both direct responsibility and proprietary grievance regarding the
Holocaust are expiring like patents, and the business of reflecting on
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it has become a free-for-all’ (2002: 97).

Sontag made an additional claim for context:
The hard truth is that what may be acceptable in elite culture may not
be acceptable in mass culture, that tastes which pose only innocuous
ethical issues, as the property of a minority become corrupting when
they become more established. Taste is context, and the context has
changed (1980b: 97).

The crucial point about context is that the imposition of a single,
official, orthodox or respectful standard to Holocaust representation
nudges perilously close to those repressive practices that enabled the
Holocaust in the first instance. As Saul Friedlander wrote:
Jean-Francois Lyotard takes “Auschwitz” as a reference to demonstrate
the impossibility of any single, integrated discourse about history and
politics. The voices of the perpetrators and those of the victims are
fundamentally heterogeneous and mutually exclusive. The striving
for totality and consensus is, in Lyotard’s view, the very basis of the
fascist enterprise (1992b: 5).

Similarly, Michael André Bernstein wrote:
The freedom to choose — one’s own philosophy, faith, communal
affiliation, and historical sense, as well as one’s mode of remembering
and representing that memory — is precisely what Nazism made
impossible for Jews, and although the affirmation of that freedom can
do nothing for the victims of the Shoah, it is the only coherent rejection
of the Nazi principle of nondifferentiation among Jews (1994: 44).

William Ian Miller’s argument is that the singularity of the
speaking position arises not politically (as fascism), nor discursively (as
history), nor morally (as judgment). For Miller it is visceral, derived
from a shared sense of disgust. He wrote:
The avowal of disgust expects concurrence. … Disgust has … powerful
communalizing capacities and is especially useful and necessary as
a builder of moral and social community. It performs this function
obviously by helping define and locate the boundary separating our
group from their group, purity from pollution, the violable from the
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inviolable (1997: 194).

Just as a Holocaust representation must decide for itself whether to
conform or confront, so too must the audience of these representations
ask itself the question: why am I looking at this? For viewers, there is
an important distinction between the quest for moral knowledge, on
the one hand, and the compulsion to fascination and curiosity, on the
other. Lawrence Douglas compared the punishment of witnessing that
was imposed upon civilians who lived near concentration camps with
the experience of watching a documentary such as Nazi Concentration
Camps. He wrote, ‘If we think of the act of viewing as a sanction,
then the film seems to impose virtually the same punishment upon
us’ (1995:472). Why do we watch Holocaust documentaries or feature
films? Why do we attend exhibitions of artworks about the Shoah? Is
this an act of punishment or pleasure, or an entangled combination
of the two? In what ways are we different from people who enjoy
watching ‘brutalities, perversions, pain, and rape’? (Bartov 1996: 128)
What does it mean that we have gone to the cinema or the museum
to look at the Holocaust?

The central contemporary question about Holocaust representation
transforms the viewer into the subject of the work: What effect does
it have upon me? Susan Sontag cautioned against being fascinated or
titillated by representations of fascism. She referred to the ‘definitely
sexual lure of fascism’ (1980b: 101) and displays of atrocity that risk
being ‘tacitly pornographic’ (1980c: 139). Further, she warned that
repeated exposure to images of atrocity, like acquired familiarity
with pornography, had the effect of reducing ‘shock’ and ‘making the
horrible seem more ordinary’ (1977: 20). Dan Stone wrote that, without
historical information to contextualise imagery of the Holocaust, it
descends into a ‘pornography of violence’ (2001: 141). The German
artist Gerhard Richter asked ‘whether the popular dissemination of
Holocaust images amounted to a new, respectable kind of pornography’;
he posed the question: ‘Where is the line between the historically
inquiring and the erotically preoccupied gaze?’ (in Young 2002:
xvii). These views locate pornography as the opposite of responsible
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representation. They state that, when Holocaust imagery crosses this line
we have gone too far.

For Jean-Pierre Geuens (1995-96), however, pornography
performs precisely the transgression that Holocaust representation
requires. His essay discusses a group of pornographic films set in
concentration camps where female camp internees are sexually
exploited by SS officer; films with titles like Nazi Love Camp #27,
Deported Women of the SS Special Sections, SS Hell Camp. Geuens
argued that the films, themselves part of a much larger genre of
‘Holocaust porn’ or ‘Nazisploitation’ films which include such titles
as Ilsa, She-Wolf of the SS and Gestapo’s Last Orgy, ‘fall short’ because
‘they truly do not measure up to the situation’ (1995-96: 126). The
subject, he claimed, ‘asked for a unique vision’ which these films, by
confining themselves within anticipated pornographic conventions,
failed to fulfil (Geuens 1995-96: 126). These films ought to have
‘transgress[ed] the good conscience that permeates, for instance, the
ending of Schindler’s List, where the colorful closure of the “good”
people alive today permits us to relegate the darkness that preceded
to an aberration of history’ (Geuens 1995-96: 126). Concentration
camp porn, Geuens insisted, needs to destroy the ‘cordons sanitaires
that society erects to protect us from being soiled by the stench and
the excrescence of the camps’ (1995-96: 127). This may be acceptable
if it is the purpose of pornography and its consumers to engage in
a discourse about the Holocaust. But if the pornographic enterprise
relies upon an arbitrary context in which sexual gratification is played
out, then Holocaust becomes a ‘setting’, a crime ‘scene’; nothing more.
However, something else, something more than a crime scene,
seems to be behind apocryphal claims, probably initiated by Andrea
Dworkin (1990), that there is a Holocaust porn industry based in
Israel, making films and magazines for the Israeli Jewish market.
For Dworkin, the pornographic genre permitted power — including
sexual power — to be reclaimed by victims who had survived, in
order to themselves become victimisers (part of her larger critique of
the Israeli state). Joshua Cohen, accepting Dworkin’s claims that this
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industry existed, wrote that this is where ‘things get dirty’ (2003).
This is because, regardless of the veracity of Dworkin’s claims, they
fit easily into Berel Lang’s transgressive representational register as
both imaginable and possible. And they provide the necessary shock
that motivates the contemporary viewer to experience Holocaust
crimes with an intensity that would otherwise, with the passage of
time, fade.
Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, in her catalogue essay from the Mirroring
Evil exhibition, imagined the effect of transgressive Holocaust
representations as a lingering spectre tugging at our psyche:
And we, the audience, straighten a skirt here, a tie there, and prepare
to exit. But as we are about to leave, perhaps – just perhaps — an
invisible hand grips our throat and we realize that something of these
acts of impersonation will continue to haunt us even into the sunshine
of a world after Auschwitz (2002: 35, using metaphor from a poem by
Wisława Szymborska).

Lawrence Douglas wrote that a ‘crisis of representation … has
come to characterise efforts to find an idiom capable of capturing the
Holocaust’s central horror’ (1995: 452). Introducing the documentary
film into evidence at Nuremberg, Robert Jackson said, ‘Our proof
will be disgusting and you will say I have robbed you of your sleep’
(in Douglas: 1995: 450). It seems necessary to locate Holocaust
representation within a discourse of disgust, because it may be the
only way out of the sense of profound pointlessness that comes from
strolling through a gallery and thinking about the Holocaust. Passive
reflection on atrocity has no function; it makes no contribution to
knowledge, it isn’t original or activist or pedagogical. The difference
is in the pit of the stomach. Looking at art whilst thinking about
atrocity represents failure in the social subject; looking in disgust seems
a marginally more productive cultural practice. William Ian Miller
wrote, ‘Disgust signals our being appalled, signals the fact that we
are paying more than lip-service; its presence lets us know we are
truly in the grip of the norm whose violation we are witnessing or
imagining’ (1997:194).
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Disgust becomes a cultural practice, representing the embodied
difference between neutral curiosity and something more. For Miller,
disgust describes ‘our responses to the ordinary vices of hypocrisy,
betrayal, cruelty, and stupidity’ (1997: 194). But we must be careful
that we do not impart a kind of equivalence upon these vices. Cruelty
disgusts us: we condemn it. Stupidity disgusts us, but it is not as bad.
When we have bad visceral responses to something, we must ensure
that our sense of nausea does not prevent us from differentiating. To
think about the shrunken head of Buchenwald invokes a churning in
the gut; something similar happens when reading an interview with
Tom Sachs about fashion’s manipulative potential to make us jealous.
But one of these represents atrocities of dehumanisation, the other
is a conceptual artist’s failure to think things through. Our ongoing
responsibility is to remember that, despite our wish to sanction both
of them, they do not transgress the same limit.

Notes

1
2

This piece of research assumed many forms before becoming this article,
and I owe large and long-standing debts to many friends and colleagues for
helping me to think my way through this difficult terrain. I give particular
thanks to Irene Baghoomians, who conveyed the exhibition catalogue to
me from New York via a circuitous route, to David Fraser, who read it in
its earliest form, to Nicole Graham and Paul McCartan, who untangled
some of its threads, and to the editors Derek Dalton and Rebecca Scott
Bray, for encouraging me to persist with it. I am also very grateful to the
anonymous referees for their careful and thoughtful responses to this
article.
Elvis Costello 1979 ‘Goon Squad’ from Armed Forces [CD] Radar/
Columbia Records.
View the film – one loop, 12 seconds – here: <http://www.boazarad.net/
safam2.html> accessed 13 July 2009.
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